Wednesday, July 19, 2006

Assessing the North Korean Threat: Background

Recently, I posed a question to the kids in the SAT prep class I teach in Korea: does North Korea pose a realistic threat? Admittedly, this was probably not the most ethical thing ever, as I fully intended to use their responses for the purpose of this article (and did I mention I never told them that?). Similarly, this doesn’t provide a very good indication as to what South Koreans think, as many of my students have spent more time in the last 5-6 years outside of Korea than in it. One student had to ask if it was okay that she was answering because she was “biased” after having lived in the US for too long. Generally, however, when asked if they thought North Korea posed a threat (to South Korea, Japan, the US, the world – I left it open ended) most of them thought that the belligerent little dictatorship of Kim Jong-Il’s was not a realistic threat. Most had good reasons. Some had awful ones, but that happens in these prep classes.

However, it raised an important question that I realized I had no answer for. What threat does the North Korean regime pose and to whom? The question itself raises other important questions about whether or not the North Korean regime acts rationally and whether that rationality is based on the country as a whole or merely resides in the leadership. Stated more concisely, is North Korea primarily and extension of Kim Jong-Il or is it an actual state – albeit an abnormal one. Since both of these questions are rather difficult to answer for any analyst, it is perhaps better to look at North Korea itself and the situation in which it finds itself.

The launch of 7 mid to long range ballistic missiles represents just the most recent show of brinkmanship for a country that has a long history of brinkmanship. In fact, this missile launch is not extraordinary because it took place, as a similar show of force occurred in 1998 when the Hermit Kingdom launched a volley of missiles over the northern Japanese islands, causes frantic responses form a now seriously endangered Japanese government. Similarly threatening actions and statements can be found in nearly any front of North Korean foreign policy. In their conflict with Japan over sanctions in response to failed efforts to resolve the ongoing abductions issue, North Korea stated that any such sanctions would be viewed as an act of war. Japan subsequently backed down. When it comes to normal North Korean announcements, war, destruction, annihilation, and a host of similarly ominous terms constantly fill their responses to any overt act against them. It seems that blustering and blowing and making it seem that the house might come down is simply the way that North Korea operates. And it seems that they have a number of reasons to be concerned.

North Korea currently is feeling the mounting weight of both external and internal pressure in a degree that the regime has never before experienced. There are a few reasons for this. For starters, frustration amongst the countries involved in the six party talks is perhaps at an all time high as last summers glimmer of hope in the form of a joint statement was immediately shot down by North Korean retractions and revised demands. Nothing except further stall tactics has taken place since. Secondly, North Korea’s ability to make money through its illegal operations has been sharply curtailed. More and more countries are becoming aware that even embassies can double as drug trafficking hubs and North Korean cargo ships also may be carrying enough drugs to finance the entire regime. Similarly, the severe US response to North Korean money laundering has cut off numerous venues for revenue and even turned North Korea’s partners in crime away from them. Reports point to US punitive efforts as a source of frustration as the North Korean economy has been stalling again.

On top of this is the food crisis. Though, it may be argued, North Korea never truly recovered from the crisis of the mid 1990s, Pyongyang saw it fit to force out international aid organizations that were responsible for feeding nearly a third of the country’s population. Among those groups was the World Food Program (note: the United States was the single largest donor through the WFP and it is interesting to mention that the WFP still described its efforts in North Korea as “emergency relief” even after nearly ten years of work) [see WFP reports on donors and activites]. Most analyst saw this as a foolish move despite North Korean claims that its food distribution system was ready to get back up and running. On top of this, they continued to receive aid from both China and South Korea. However, neither country monitored the distribution of their aid with any vigor nor questioned North Korea when told they could not monitor its distribution. Despite the presence of Chinese and South Korean aid, it seems that famine may be rearing its head again and calls have gone out for the WFP to consider returning to North Korea. This fact brings us to our first target of North Korean threats.

next post - Victims and Targets

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