Educated Elite?

The BBC’s publication of an article on how the current financial crisis is hitting not only Chinese factories, production, and the economy at large, but will directly squeeze the college students set to graduate in the summer. This, of course, goes without saying and is likely true of most countries across the world. I can vouch for the market shock has left friends with jobs threatened, lost, or never found to begin with. But the issue in China hits a spot that has already been weakened by years of growing tension.

In 1999, the Chinese government decided upon a generally beneficial and highly laudable program of education opportunity expansion that would dramatically increase the number of students enrolled in institutes of higher education. What had previously been available to a mere few would now be possible for far more as the government pressed to draw ever more people into the benefits of the developing economy. The results, as can be seen in the graph below, were dramatic.Within just a few years, the number of students enrolled in college quadrupled, expanding education opportunities to a previously unheard of scale. The problem with this was that economic growth was not keeping pace, or at least not in the way that had been hoped. Much of China’s growth has been in areas of production. The development of sectors that require highly trained, better educated populations have developed, but at a much slower pace, and certainly not in the exponential way that college enrollment has increased.

This became and remains problematic for a number of reasons. To begin with, it meant that far too many graduates were finding themselves unemployed or “underemployed” (employed in jobs or fields that either paid far less than expected or that could have been obtained without the investment in a college education). A second problem has been that this is a compounded crisis. Each year a larger number of graduates than before end up without suitable work and they are added to the prior pool of still unemployed graduates. In 2004, the first year that the boom classes began to graduate, this excess number of graduates was about half a million. That number has increased by around 200,000-300,000 each year. As Chris Hogg notes in the BBC article, there are an estimate six and a half million students graduating this next year. There were two and a half million in 2004.

Even before the current financial crisis, economic pressure was etched into the lives of Chinese students. Having had the opportunity to talk with hundreds of students in multiple major cities, I found that jobs and financial security was one of the most commonly discussed topics, competing tightly with the issues of dating and relationships for the lead. But even relationships eventually lead to discussions of economic solvency as young men bewail the twin curses of likely not having the economic stature to get married until their mid thirties (counting a well paid job, car, and apartment as must haves and calculating based on expected salaries after graduating) and seeing the most desirable of their female classmates often choosing to marry up – finding a financially established though older man. Female students often discuss their college years as a time to play around in relationships – to fall in and out of love – because their choices concerning marriage will be more pragmatically motivated. It also goes without saying that the pressures of the one Child policy and the necessity that such a single child provide for both his parents and grandparents is universally felt.

The government is promising job creation. This, however, may prove a pipe-dream as the economy continues to contract. It is also important to note that creating more jobs for struggling graduates has been tried before but to little effect. Nine million jobs is the exact number that the government promised to create in 2003 to meet the needs of the coming graduate class. That scheme was nearly imperceptible in terms of overall impact over the next few years (China Daily December 23, 2003).

As much as the media has pointed to the closing of factories and the return of migrant workers to their hometowns as an anxious and unemployed class as a possible source of social instability, unemployed college graduates may be an even bigger problem. For starters, workers are much more likely to act locally, responding to specific grievances through specific means with very tangible ends in mind. They are also limited in terms of the scope of their activities. Local disturbances, though sometimes large (hence the popular use of the term “mass disturbances”) rarely expand beyond their locale. Students are a frighteningly different story. These unemployed masses are far more interconnected as they have grown up with a healthy diet of cell-phones, text messages, blogs and BBS boards. These are the engines of widespread mass movements over the last few years. The anti-Japan riots in 2005 and anti-French protests of last year were all products of mobilization via internet resources, as are the frequent and frightening human flesh searches. This is the playground of the jobless student.

Students graduating without jobs also have a bit more to gripe about. This is not in regards to their level of estrangement from the benefits of the state, but more in terms of their having invested heavily and lost out. The amount of pressure, studious hours, and money spent to get a student into and through college is enormous. To emerge from that process jobless or with prospects no different than one who had never entered at all is a hard for most students to simply accept. It would be hard to imagine these students not exhibiting some form of frustration; the questions remain what form, at whom and to what degree.

When Bailouts Aren't Forthcoming

CDT [China Digital Times] picked up on rumors circulating the blogosphere concerning the possibility that a few of China’s car manufacturing giants were contemplating buying into the current turmoil surrounding the “Big Three” American automotive firms (GM, Ford, and Chrysler). This would not be the first time that Chinese companies have attempted buying major American brands, but all that is left to us is the joy of speculation as to what might transpire as we wait for confirmation of any such deals.

One of those prior deals - China National Offshore Oil Corp.’s, or CNOOC, bid for Unocal – might prove an interesting point of comparison. That particular bid , occurring in 2005, created quite the stir in the American media when it became particularly concerning to Capitol Hill. Politicians became severely concerned by the idea of CNOOC (a largely state-owned oil company) buying up an American oil firm. “National security” was waved all over the place and, given that competition between the US and China over fuel sources is projected to be a serious point of conflict, the panic found quite a few believers far too frightened to sit tight and watch the deal go through. The plan was eventually scuttled when it became too politically sensitive for CNOOC to complete the bid and for Unocal to accept it. Many experts had doubts about the reality of the threat many congressmen were trumpeting, but it made little difference on an issue so particularly sensitive. Especially given that CNOOC is, again, has rather clear links to the central government. The incident was highly instructive in how politically charged economic competition with China really is.

Now the question is what reaction China will get from the Hill in a time of crisis. The car industry is not the same as concerns about oil corporations and access to reserves, but the enormity of these brand names alone may startle people. It may also be enough to push senators into action over the proposed bailouts for the Big Three, for better or for worse. The thought of Ford Motors or GM owned by a Chinese corporation (or anyone for that matter) may prick hearts enough to quicken the debate about whether and how to save Detroit. And it will also give us another glimpse of just how concerned Congress is about the growth of Chinese economic power. Congress likely can’t stop such a deal, but they can make the whole process incredibly uncomfortable.

But all this might not matter if the proposals for said sales do not materialize in the next few days. Rumors are rumors, and the benefit of such a move is not all that clear. Truthaboutcars.com , where CDT originally picked up the story, seems to think this to be a no brainer for these Chinese manufacturers:

A take-over of a large overseas auto maker would fit perfectly into China’s plans. As reported before, China has realized that its export chances are slim without unfettered access to foreign technology. The brand cachet of Chinese cars abroad is, shall we say, challenged. The Chinese could easily export Made-in-China VWs, Toyotas, Buicks. If their joint venture partner would let them. The solution: Buy the joint venture partner. Especially, when he’s in deep trouble.

The problem with deep trouble is, when you buy the company you get the trouble. This would be a business equivalent of needing to remember that your fiancé’s nightmare of a mother is part of the deal. China Car Times picks up this argument, noting that the Chinese manufactures would not only be picking up a bill for something they didn’t buy, they already are having problems of their own as domestic demand slows. The site does make another interesting point about skipping the mess of purchasing the companies themselves and just nabbing their suppliers:

What we could see is Chinese players taking over suppliers to Detroits[sic] big three in the USA, this would be an excellent time for the Chinese big players to get hold of a supply chain that is well experienced in designing, producing, and supplying quality components on a strict timetable, this is something that can be successfully [sic] carried over to production of Chinese cars in China, and improving the quality aspects that many Chinese cars suffer from.

Either way, grab some popcorn – this will be entertaining.

Hedging More Than Their Bets

Only a few weeks back, as the current global financial crisis started to spread out from the crumbling wake of bank collapses in New York, the leadership in China expressed confidence that their economic machine would be able to weather the blast. Initially, this sounded quite feasible, as the Chinese economy has been on an unfathomable upward trend of growth, particularly within the last few years (over 11% in 2007). Additionally, during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, China came through nearly unscathed even though the IMF had to bailout numerous economies in the region. But it now appears that such early confidence is dissipating in the face of slowed exports and investments due to the extent of the damage amongst China’s primary investors. What is unfolding is not only an economic rescue effort that many think will could dramatically change the composition of the Chinese economic machine, but it is also a glaring warning buzzer that things are not alright on the mainland.

China Slide –
As recession takes hold in the Eurozone and the US teeters on the edge, the export and foreign investment based economy in China has begun to feel the squeeze. This week, the Washington Post noted that, with 68,000 small companies in the Pearl River Delta collapsing and estimates of 2.5 million lost jobs, “For the first time in the 30 years since China began its capitalist transformation, there is a perception that the economy is in real trouble.” While that may be an overstatement (the 1989 Tiananmen protest was, in essence, a student reaction to the general feeling that the reforms were hurting rather than helping, and the liberalization of state-owned enterprises caused horrific levels of unemployment, especially in the industry heavy north), it certainly catches the current mood. Especially given that stock markets had already been on a nose-dive downward trajectory.

More disturbing is the dip in growth. Over the last few years, the Party has been trying hard to manage white-hot growth rates. Within months, the problem has completely reversed itself. While estimates for growth over the last quarter showed a drop from last year and many are predicting that the next quarter will show another significant drop as the economic crisis continues. Forbes relayed predictions that the rate would fall to 5.8% for the final quarter and level to around 7.5% for 2009. An NY Times article reports:

“Don’t count on China to get back to double-digit growth for the next few years,” said Dong Tao, an economist at Credit Suisse in Hong Kong.

Those numbers are certainly the envy of many a country, including most the developed nations being shellacked by financial upheaval, but they represent a rather significant problem for China. 8% GDP growth is pegged as the required level to keep China’s massive population from experiencing dangerous levels of unemployment. With civil disturbances, or mass incidents as they are called in the mainland – protests for short – already at a noticeably high level, the government is likely scared stiff at the prospect of 2.5 million unemployed, unhappy migrant workers heading home with legions more possibly following on their heels.

China’s Plan and Longterm Effects –
The plan is, in essence, two pronged: (1) to stimulate the economy through government spending on public works (ie, rail expansion, health care, rebuilding areas damaged by the May earthquake, etc.) and (2) to foster domestic private consumption to offset the slump in exports and foreign investment. The plan, as indistinct as it is at this point, would poor nearly $600 million dollars into stimulating the economy. Portions of the package seem to already be rolled into previously approved spending and the program will take around two years to fully run its course. This has produced mixed feelings about the possible success of the program. Simon Elegant quotes Ben Simpfendorfer as saying that he worries “the contraction in demand will take place before the fiscal policies have time to take effect." The Wall Street Journal ran an article with a much more optimistic review of the plan, casting it as the perfect way to loosen Chinese consumers’ notoriously tight fists. Either way, there is little to say about how the plan will turn out until more is known about the exact implementation and how much more damage will be done both to domestic business and to the foreign economies that primarily support them.

Reasons Why? –
Now, we should not go thinking that this stimulus package was put forth with much thought for the state of the global economy: this was a fundamentally self-serving effort. And for good reason. Experts had been clamoring for Chinese action to help in the crisis, but it didn’t seem Zhongnanhai was likely to budge until the water levels started to rise at home. The Times UK had a rather direct assessment of the situation:

The leadership's interest in safeguarding growth goes beyond a desire to preside over an expanding economy. In the 30 years since Deng launched China's market-led economic reforms, Marxism-Maoism has withered. The legitimacy of the one-party regime rests on its ability to provide increasing material well-being for its 1.3 billion people.

This more or less hits the nail on the head. For the Communist Party, ideology, in actuality if not in self-representation, has taken a serious back seat during the decades following the 1989 Tiananmen movement. Since, businessmen have been included and students heavily recruited to fill the ranks of the Party in an attempt to incorporate these two power bases into the fate of the Party. But it still stands that current Party authority remains tied to their ability to properly manage the growing economy and to the extent which nationalistic sentiments can be maintained. Thus, the economic crisis strikes at the very heart of the Party’s stability. However, as of now there may not be too much to fear. Regardless of the extent to which the Party pushes the concept of the “harmonious society” and the threat that rural mass incidents present to that projected harmony, there is likely little that the need seriously concern state leadership. Mass incidents and rural disturbances rarely pose serious threats to the overall stability of the state and the authority of the Party. It is more a question of monitoring sentiment among businessmen and students, for that is where any real threat has ever and could really materialize. As long as both groups see their collective fates as linked to the health of the Party-state, the boat may rock but it certainly won’t threaten to capsize. Count on the fact that the CCP knows this because they, like most people in China, have very long memories.