Sunday, January 04, 2009

Educated Elite?

The BBC’s publication of an article on how the current financial crisis is hitting not only Chinese factories, production, and the economy at large, but will directly squeeze the college students set to graduate in the summer. This, of course, goes without saying and is likely true of most countries across the world. I can vouch for the market shock has left friends with jobs threatened, lost, or never found to begin with. But the issue in China hits a spot that has already been weakened by years of growing tension.

In 1999, the Chinese government decided upon a generally beneficial and highly laudable program of education opportunity expansion that would dramatically increase the number of students enrolled in institutes of higher education. What had previously been available to a mere few would now be possible for far more as the government pressed to draw ever more people into the benefits of the developing economy. The results, as can be seen in the graph below, were dramatic.Within just a few years, the number of students enrolled in college quadrupled, expanding education opportunities to a previously unheard of scale. The problem with this was that economic growth was not keeping pace, or at least not in the way that had been hoped. Much of China’s growth has been in areas of production. The development of sectors that require highly trained, better educated populations have developed, but at a much slower pace, and certainly not in the exponential way that college enrollment has increased.

This became and remains problematic for a number of reasons. To begin with, it meant that far too many graduates were finding themselves unemployed or “underemployed” (employed in jobs or fields that either paid far less than expected or that could have been obtained without the investment in a college education). A second problem has been that this is a compounded crisis. Each year a larger number of graduates than before end up without suitable work and they are added to the prior pool of still unemployed graduates. In 2004, the first year that the boom classes began to graduate, this excess number of graduates was about half a million. That number has increased by around 200,000-300,000 each year. As Chris Hogg notes in the BBC article, there are an estimate six and a half million students graduating this next year. There were two and a half million in 2004.

Even before the current financial crisis, economic pressure was etched into the lives of Chinese students. Having had the opportunity to talk with hundreds of students in multiple major cities, I found that jobs and financial security was one of the most commonly discussed topics, competing tightly with the issues of dating and relationships for the lead. But even relationships eventually lead to discussions of economic solvency as young men bewail the twin curses of likely not having the economic stature to get married until their mid thirties (counting a well paid job, car, and apartment as must haves and calculating based on expected salaries after graduating) and seeing the most desirable of their female classmates often choosing to marry up – finding a financially established though older man. Female students often discuss their college years as a time to play around in relationships – to fall in and out of love – because their choices concerning marriage will be more pragmatically motivated. It also goes without saying that the pressures of the one Child policy and the necessity that such a single child provide for both his parents and grandparents is universally felt.

The government is promising job creation. This, however, may prove a pipe-dream as the economy continues to contract. It is also important to note that creating more jobs for struggling graduates has been tried before but to little effect. Nine million jobs is the exact number that the government promised to create in 2003 to meet the needs of the coming graduate class. That scheme was nearly imperceptible in terms of overall impact over the next few years (China Daily December 23, 2003).

As much as the media has pointed to the closing of factories and the return of migrant workers to their hometowns as an anxious and unemployed class as a possible source of social instability, unemployed college graduates may be an even bigger problem. For starters, workers are much more likely to act locally, responding to specific grievances through specific means with very tangible ends in mind. They are also limited in terms of the scope of their activities. Local disturbances, though sometimes large (hence the popular use of the term “mass disturbances”) rarely expand beyond their locale. Students are a frighteningly different story. These unemployed masses are far more interconnected as they have grown up with a healthy diet of cell-phones, text messages, blogs and BBS boards. These are the engines of widespread mass movements over the last few years. The anti-Japan riots in 2005 and anti-French protests of last year were all products of mobilization via internet resources, as are the frequent and frightening human flesh searches. This is the playground of the jobless student.

Students graduating without jobs also have a bit more to gripe about. This is not in regards to their level of estrangement from the benefits of the state, but more in terms of their having invested heavily and lost out. The amount of pressure, studious hours, and money spent to get a student into and through college is enormous. To emerge from that process jobless or with prospects no different than one who had never entered at all is a hard for most students to simply accept. It would be hard to imagine these students not exhibiting some form of frustration; the questions remain what form, at whom and to what degree.

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Sunday, November 16, 2008

Hedging More Than Their Bets

Only a few weeks back, as the current global financial crisis started to spread out from the crumbling wake of bank collapses in New York, the leadership in China expressed confidence that their economic machine would be able to weather the blast. Initially, this sounded quite feasible, as the Chinese economy has been on an unfathomable upward trend of growth, particularly within the last few years (over 11% in 2007). Additionally, during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, China came through nearly unscathed even though the IMF had to bailout numerous economies in the region. But it now appears that such early confidence is dissipating in the face of slowed exports and investments due to the extent of the damage amongst China’s primary investors. What is unfolding is not only an economic rescue effort that many think will could dramatically change the composition of the Chinese economic machine, but it is also a glaring warning buzzer that things are not alright on the mainland.

China Slide –
As recession takes hold in the Eurozone and the US teeters on the edge, the export and foreign investment based economy in China has begun to feel the squeeze. This week, the Washington Post noted that, with 68,000 small companies in the Pearl River Delta collapsing and estimates of 2.5 million lost jobs, “For the first time in the 30 years since China began its capitalist transformation, there is a perception that the economy is in real trouble.” While that may be an overstatement (the 1989 Tiananmen protest was, in essence, a student reaction to the general feeling that the reforms were hurting rather than helping, and the liberalization of state-owned enterprises caused horrific levels of unemployment, especially in the industry heavy north), it certainly catches the current mood. Especially given that stock markets had already been on a nose-dive downward trajectory.

More disturbing is the dip in growth. Over the last few years, the Party has been trying hard to manage white-hot growth rates. Within months, the problem has completely reversed itself. While estimates for growth over the last quarter showed a drop from last year and many are predicting that the next quarter will show another significant drop as the economic crisis continues. Forbes relayed predictions that the rate would fall to 5.8% for the final quarter and level to around 7.5% for 2009. An NY Times article reports:

“Don’t count on China to get back to double-digit growth for the next few years,” said Dong Tao, an economist at Credit Suisse in Hong Kong.

Those numbers are certainly the envy of many a country, including most the developed nations being shellacked by financial upheaval, but they represent a rather significant problem for China. 8% GDP growth is pegged as the required level to keep China’s massive population from experiencing dangerous levels of unemployment. With civil disturbances, or mass incidents as they are called in the mainland – protests for short – already at a noticeably high level, the government is likely scared stiff at the prospect of 2.5 million unemployed, unhappy migrant workers heading home with legions more possibly following on their heels.

China’s Plan and Longterm Effects –
The plan is, in essence, two pronged: (1) to stimulate the economy through government spending on public works (ie, rail expansion, health care, rebuilding areas damaged by the May earthquake, etc.) and (2) to foster domestic private consumption to offset the slump in exports and foreign investment. The plan, as indistinct as it is at this point, would poor nearly $600 million dollars into stimulating the economy. Portions of the package seem to already be rolled into previously approved spending and the program will take around two years to fully run its course. This has produced mixed feelings about the possible success of the program. Simon Elegant quotes Ben Simpfendorfer as saying that he worries “the contraction in demand will take place before the fiscal policies have time to take effect." The Wall Street Journal ran an article with a much more optimistic review of the plan, casting it as the perfect way to loosen Chinese consumers’ notoriously tight fists. Either way, there is little to say about how the plan will turn out until more is known about the exact implementation and how much more damage will be done both to domestic business and to the foreign economies that primarily support them.

Reasons Why? –
Now, we should not go thinking that this stimulus package was put forth with much thought for the state of the global economy: this was a fundamentally self-serving effort. And for good reason. Experts had been clamoring for Chinese action to help in the crisis, but it didn’t seem Zhongnanhai was likely to budge until the water levels started to rise at home. The Times UK had a rather direct assessment of the situation:

The leadership's interest in safeguarding growth goes beyond a desire to preside over an expanding economy. In the 30 years since Deng launched China's market-led economic reforms, Marxism-Maoism has withered. The legitimacy of the one-party regime rests on its ability to provide increasing material well-being for its 1.3 billion people.


This more or less hits the nail on the head. For the Communist Party, ideology, in actuality if not in self-representation, has taken a serious back seat during the decades following the 1989 Tiananmen movement. Since, businessmen have been included and students heavily recruited to fill the ranks of the Party in an attempt to incorporate these two power bases into the fate of the Party. But it still stands that current Party authority remains tied to their ability to properly manage the growing economy and to the extent which nationalistic sentiments can be maintained. Thus, the economic crisis strikes at the very heart of the Party’s stability. However, as of now there may not be too much to fear. Regardless of the extent to which the Party pushes the concept of the “harmonious society” and the threat that rural mass incidents present to that projected harmony, there is likely little that the need seriously concern state leadership. Mass incidents and rural disturbances rarely pose serious threats to the overall stability of the state and the authority of the Party. It is more a question of monitoring sentiment among businessmen and students, for that is where any real threat has ever and could really materialize. As long as both groups see their collective fates as linked to the health of the Party-state, the boat may rock but it certainly won’t threaten to capsize. Count on the fact that the CCP knows this because they, like most people in China, have very long memories.

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Wednesday, October 01, 2008

The Moon - China's Next Big Thing?

The big news in mainland Chinese news portals was the recent return of the Shenzhou 7, the Chinese spacecraft that carried a manned shuttle into orbit. One of the crew, Zhai Zhigang, became the first Chinese to space walk, exiting the ship for just shy of fifteen minutes. The effort was a ringing success, aside from disgruntled commercial air passengers who had flights grounded, without prior warning, before the lift-off and the comical mistake on the part of the Xinhua news agency who reported a successful launch, including detailed dialogue with the crew, before the ship had left the platform.

The Chinese space program is an interesting phenomenon. The rise of taikonauts to join the ranks of astronauts and cosmonauts is peculiar in a post-Cold War era where the advent of space tourism is on the up. Additionally, before this and earlier flights, cries directed at the reasonableness of such a program in a country that has no lack of needy programs. Zhang Hong in the Guardian puts it rather directly noting that “Since China started this programme, there's no sign that it will stop any time soon. The undisclosed cost of the Shenzhou programme, normally calculated into the military's expense, will keep rising in the foreseeable future without any practical benefits. This would likely spark dissatisfaction among lawmakers since China has many other areas hungry for capital, including the rebuilding of the earthquake-hit areas, the anti-poverty strategy in rural areas and the huge hole in the pension system.” But what Zhang Hong notes there at the beginning of his quote is perhaps the most important point. Manned flights and space walks are just the beginning, even according to Chinese space program authorities.

But the resounding question is why? There are two reasonable options: (1) a heightened competition with the United States in the global hegemony tug of war. Space represented and important front in the posturing of the Cold War, and there is plenty pointing to the possibility that China is doing a lot of posturing behind the smoke and mirrors of their claims to a “peaceful rise.” Among these would include the dramatic investment in their military and the not so subtle buddying up with authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa. (2) the Chinese see this as a source of pride that will only add to their claim to be a world power of the highest sort and will put before the people yet another grand vision of national unity and collective accomplish for the glory of the motherland and the benefit of the future.

Personally, I am not sold on the first of these options. It is one better known to neo-conservative foreign policy types who are always looking for the next country trying to dislodge American pre-eminence. I in no way believe in the peacefulness or benevolence of the Chinese government, but the Communist Party leadership knows as well as anyone that they are joined at the hip with the US and cannot afford to directly confront them, nor do they have much reason to want to.

The second option is strangely compelling, especially given the timing of the launch. Late September puts us one month beyond the mother of all national unity events in China. The Olympic Games were a historical moment that overwhelmed the last seven years of Chinese political and social life. Much was sacrificed and sanctioned in the name of the harmonious society necessary for a successful games. Homes were torn down, money spent in absurd quantities, rights suspended, and lives co-opted all in the name of the Olympics. And the amazing thing was how the people bought this. It would not be overdoing it to say that the Hu Jintao leadership and his emphasis on a harmonious society were sincerely aided by the presence of the games and the “Olympic Spirit.” One need look no further than the riots in Tibet and the reaction in mainland China to realize the scope of its influence. Reactions were in no way turned to trying to explain why a whole minority group would so violently show their disapproval and rather were turned to a fierce defense of the pride of a nation coming under increasing scrutiny from abroad. The internet was flooded with anti-Western media content and one couldn’t speak a word otherwise without being branded a traitor. Newspaper editors who said otherwise were hounded out of their jobs and a Duke student was made famous when she came under attack from the wrath of the netizen mob.

Thus, it would be unexceptional for the Party to be seeking for a replacement for the Olympic spirit. It is conceivable that a moon landing could, in some smaller way, be the next source of nationalistic fervor. Without doubt, the Apollo program captured American imagination and sentiments in a way that could still bring a crumbling country together. Could Chinese leaders be hoping for a similar source of social cohesion? They have, historically, been nigh shameless in their use of symbols for nationalistic fervor, with Japan being an unfortunate recipient of much of that ire. Nationalism and ethnic unity have been vital to continued Party dominance. We just might be seeing the man behind the curtain trying to change the wizard’s face. And that, to answer Zhang Hong's question of whether China can afford such a program, as we saw with the spectacular Olympic spectacle, is always worth it.

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